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I. INTRODUCTION
North Carolina v. A/ford' is one of the most interesting, but least
understood, cases in the area of criminal procedure. 2 In A/ford, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that a defendant who had testified under oath that he
did not commit the crime and thereafter continued to profess his
innocence3 would be permitted to plead guilty to murder.4 The plea was
entered by the defendant to avoid the death penalty.5

This decision has given rise to substantial litigation and a number of
issues. The most profound of these is whether our criminal justice system
should permit pleas of guilty from defendants who swear under oath that
they are innocent. It also raises the question of what exactly is the nature
of an Alford plea. Is it simply a plea of nolo contendre by another name,
or is it something different? It is clear that courts have discretion whether
or not to accept an Alford plea. 6 One judge may accept an Alford plea,
thereby saving that defendant from the death penalty. At the same time
the judge in the courtroom next door may refuse an Alford plea proffered
by a similarly-situated defendant, ultimately resulting in the execution of
that defendant. This raises literally life and death issues relating to equal
treatment and equal protection. There are a number of other negative
1. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
2. The issues arising from the plea procedure approved by the Court, known as the Alford
plea, have given rise to a substantial number of articles and comments. See, e.g., Albert W.
Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in PleaBargaining,84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1975); Stephanos
Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of
AlfordandNolo ContenderePleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361 (2003); Roy Tesler, JAGG, USNR,
The Guilty Plea is Innocent: Effects ofNorth Carolina v. Alford on Pleading under the UCMJ, 26
JAG. J. 15 (1971); Byran H. Ward, A Plea Best Not Taken: Why CriminalDefendants Should
Avoid the Alford Plea, 68 Mo. L. REv. 913 (2003); Anne D. Gooch, Note, Admitting Guilt by
Professing Innocence: When Sentence Enhancements Based on Alford Pleas are
Unconstitutional,63 VAND. L. REV. 1755 (2010); Alice J. Hinshaw, Comment, State v. Cameron:
Making the Alford Plea an Effective Tool in Sex Offense Cases, 55 MONT. L. REV. 281 (1994);
Claire L. Molesworth, Note, Knowledge versus Acknowledgment: Rethinking the Alford Plea in
Sexual Assault Cases, 6 SEATrLE J. FOR Soc. JUST. 907 (2008); Jenny Elayne Ronis, Case Note
and Comment, The PragmaticPlea: Expanding Use of the Alford Plea to Promote Traditionally
Conflicting Interests of the CriminalJustice System, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1389 (2010); Peg Schultz,
Comment, The Alford Plea in Juvenile Court, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 187 (2006); Thomas R.
Sanfiner, The Guilty Plea is Innocent: Effects ofNorth Carolina v. Alford on PleadingUnder the
UCMJ, 26 JAG J. 15 (1971); Curtis J. Shipley, Note, The Alford Plea: A Necessary but
Unpredictable Tool for the Criminal Defendant, 72 IOWA L. REv. 1063 (1987); Kaytee Vota,
Comment, The Truth Behind Echols v. State: How an Alford Guilty Plea Saved the West Memphis
Three, 45 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1003 (2012); Warren Moise, SailingBetween Scilla and Charybdis:
Nolo Contendere andAlford Pleas, 17 S.C. LAW. 10 (2006).
3. Alford, 400 U.S. at 28.
4. Id. at 38.
5. Id. at 28.
6. Id.at38n.l1.
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implications of Alford pleas for judges, prosecutors, criminal defense
attorneys, criminal defendants, victims, and society at large. Finally, the
collateral consequences of an Alford plea are less than clear. Does a
conviction based on Alford suffice for sentencing enhancement? Is it
sufficient to give rise to collateral estoppel in a civil case? May such a
conviction be used to impeach the credibility of the defendant if he or she
takes the witness stand in a subsequent proceeding? In this article we will
explore these questions and others, including the possibility that North
Carolinav. Alford was wrongly decided.
II. BACKGROUND

At first glance, it might appear that the motivation for the institution
of Alford pleas was to assist the prosecutor by permitting guilty pleas,
even in cases where defendants are unwilling to admit their guilt.
7
However, the predecessor case of McCoy v. United States and the
Court's opinion in Alford make it clear that this is not the case. These
pleas are viewed by the courts as being favorable to defendants by giving
them the opportunity to avoid convictions and sentences on more serious
charges.8
McCoy, decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in 1966, is viewed by many as the precursor to Alford
9
and was cited with approval by the Court in the A/ford opinion. In
McCoy, the defendant was charged with the five-year offense of
unauthorized use of a vehicle.'o At the conclusion of the government's
case, the government offered to accept a guilty plea to taking property
without right, which carried a maximum sentence of six months in jail."
The defendant agreed to plead guilty to the lesser offense, but during the
12
plea colloquy he denied taking the automobile without right. The court
refused to accept the plea without the defendant admitting guilt, and the
case resumed, resulting in a jury verdict of guilty of unauthorized use of
a vehicle.' 3 Mr. McCoy was then sentenced to eight months to three
years. 14 On appeal, the court determined that the plea of guilty proffered
in that case met the standards of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure,'" making it clear that such a plea of guilty could be accepted,
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

363 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Id. at 308; Alford, 400 U.S. at 33.
Alford, 400 U.S. at 33.
McCoy, 363 F.2d at 306-07.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Rule 11 provides:
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even where the defendant maintains his or her innocence. However, the
court also held that even if the plea meets those standards, the trial court
retains discretion as to whether or not to accept the plea. It found that in
that case the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to accept
the plea.1 6 The McCoy decision was noted and quoted by the Court in
Alford:
[Other courts] have argued that, since "guilt, or the degree of guilt,
is at times uncertain and elusive," "[a]n accused, though believing
in or entertaining doubts respecting his innocence, might
reasonably conclude a jury would be convinced of his guilt and
that he would fare better in the sentence by pleading guilty.""
In North Carolina v. Alford the defendant was charged with firstdegree murder and, if convicted, faced the death penalty. Significantly, at
a hearing on the plea offer Mr. Alford took the stand and swore under
oath that he had not committed the murder:
After giving his version of the events of the night of the murder,
Alford stated:
"I pleaded guilty on second degree murder because they said there
is too much evidence, but I ain't shot no man, but I take the fault
for the other man. We never had an argument in our life and I just
pleaded guilty because they said if I didn't they would gas me for
it, and that is all."

Q [by Alford's

attorney]. And you authorized me to tender a plea
of guilty to second degree murder before the court?
A. Yes, sir.

A defendant may plead notguilty, guilty or, with the consent of the court, nolo
contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept
the plea without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily with
understanding of the nature of the charge. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the
court refuses to accept the plea of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails to
appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.

Id. at 307.
16. Id at 308-09.
17. McCoy v. United States, 124 U.S. App. D.C. 177, 179, 363 F.2d 306, 308 (1966)
(citation omitted); Alford, 400 U.S. at 33, 34 (quoting McCoy v. United States, 363 F.2d, 306,
308 (D.C. Cir. 1966)).
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Q. And

in doing that, that you have again affirmed your decision
.on that point?
A. Well, I'm still pleading that you all got me to plead guilty. I
plead the other way, circumstantial evidence; that the jury will
prosecute me on-on the second. You told me to plead guilty, right.
I don't-I'm not guilty but I plead guilty.' 8
The Court noted that: "Ordinarily, a judgment of conviction resting
on a plea of guilty is justified by the defendant's admission that he
committed the crime charged against him and his consent that judgment
be entered without a trial of any kind."' 9 However, it stated that an
express admission of guilt is not constitutionally required and a defendant
"may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the
imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit
his participation in the acts constituting the crime." 2 0 The Court's holding
is succinctly stated in the following passage:

18.
19.
20.

Id. at 28 n.2.
Id at 31-32.
Id. at 37. The Court made it clear that this was a plea of guilty under Rule II of the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and not a plea of nolo contendere:
Nor can we perceive any material difference between a plea that refuses to admit

commission of the criminal act and a plea containing a protestation of innocence
when, as in the instant case, a defendant intelligently concludes that his interests
require entry of a guilty plea and record before the judge contains strong evidence

of actual guilt.
Id. at 37. The court went on to note:
Throughout its history, that is, the plea of nolo contendere has been viewed not

as an express admission of guilt but as a consent by the defendant that he may be
punished as if he were guilty and a prayer for leniency. Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. [sic]
11 preserves this distinction in its requirement that a court cannot accept a guilty
plea 'unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea': there is no
similar requirement for pleas of nolo contendere, since it was thought desirable
to permit defendants to plead nolo without making any inquiry into their actual

guilt. See Notes of Advisory Committee to Rule 11.
Id. at 35 n.8. See also United States v. Mackins, 218 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2000) ("Thus, as the
government succinctly states, '[t]here is no such thing [as an Alford disposition], at least not
separate and distinct from a plea of guilty."'); United States v. Tunning, 69 F.3d 107, 110-11 (6th
Cir. 1995) ("An Alford-type guilty plea is a guilty plea in all material respects"); Gooch, supra
note 2, at 1758 n.16; infra note 32 and accompanying text. The similarity between nolo contendere
pleas and Alford pleas had led to some confusion, and, notwithstanding the Court's clear language
to the contrary, some courts have treated them as being virtually the same. See, e.g., United States
v. Buonocore, 416 F.3d 1124, 1129-30 (10th Cir. 2005).
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When his plea is viewed in light of the evidence against him, which
substantially negated his claim of innocence and which further
provided a means by which the judge could test whether the plea
was being intelligently entered, its validity cannot be seriously
questioned. In view of the strong factual basis for the plea
demonstrated by the State and Alford's clearly expressed desire to
enter it despite his professed belief in his innocence, we hold that
the trial judge did not commit constitutional error in accepting it.2 1
With these words, the Alford plea was born. 22 Henceforth defendants
professing their innocence would, nonetheless, be permitted to plead
guilty if there is a plea bargain favorable to the defendant and the
government can demonstrate a strong factual basis for the plea.2 3 Such
pleas will be permitted even where the defendant swears under oath,
under penalty of perjury, that he or she did not commit the offense to
which the plea of guilty is being entered. 24 The Court did, however, make
it clear that judges are not required to accept Alford pleas and the decision
whether or not to do so is left to the discretion of the trial court.25 States
may also bar their courts from accepting Alford pleas where defendants
assert their innocence. 26
III. THE NATURE OF THE ALFORD PLEA

A plea of guilty under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure traditionally takes place under circumstances where the
defendant admits to conduct that constitutes the offense to which he or
she is pleading guilty. This is commonly known as, and will hereinafter
be referred to as, a "straight plea." There is also a plea of nolo contendre
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Alford, 400 U.S. at 37-38 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 39.
The Court stated:
Our holding does not mean that a trial judge must accept every constitutionally
valid guilty plea merely because a defendant wishes so to plead. A criminal
defendant does not have an absolute right under the Constitution to have his

guilty plea accepted by the court, although the States may by statute or otherwise
confer such a right. Likewise, the States may bar their courts from accepting
guilty pleas from any defendants who assert their -innocence. Cf. Fed.Rule

Crim.Proc. 11, which gives a trial judge discretion to "refuse to accept a plea of
guilty * * *." We need not now delineate the scope of that discretion.

Id. at 38 n.1 1 (citation omitted).
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which is viewed "not as an express admission of guilt but as a consent by
the defendant that he may be punished as if he were guilty and a prayer
for leniency." 2 7 The Court in A/ford made it clear that, even though the
defendant is not admitting guilt, an Alford plea is viewed as a plea of
guilty under Rule 11 and not as a nolo contendre plea.28 In doing so it
noted that pleas of guilty under Rule 11, including Alford pleas, require
that the trial court be satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea,
while pleas of nolo contendre have no such requirement.29
Thus it cannot be argued that an Alford plea is simply a plea of nolo
contendere by another name. As one author has noted, Alford and nolo
contendre pleas differ in two significant ways. 3 0 Nolo contendere pleas
31
avoid estoppel in later civil cases, while Alford pleas do not. Also, in
the nolo contendere situation the defendant simply refuses to admit guilt,
while in the case of Alford pleas, the defendants may affirmatively assert
their innocence. 32 Alford pleas are substantively different from pleas of
33
nolo contendere, which at least one court has viewed with disfavor.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 35 n.8.
Id.
Id.
Bibas, supra note 2, at 1373.
Id.

32.

Id. As one commentator has noted, "[w]hile a nolo contendere plea cannot be used

against a defendant in later civil litigation about the same cause, an Alford defendant, like all who
plead guilty, may not later deny his admission of guilt in the new forum." Schultz, supra note 2,
at 191-92 and authority cited therein at n.41. Another noted: "When a defendant enters a nolo

contendere plea, collateral estoppel will not apply in a subsequent civil suit because the defendant
consents to accept punishment without any charges being actually litigated or determined." Ronis,
supranote 2, at 1405 and authorities cited therein at n.160. See also United States v. Bearden, 274

F.3d 1031, 1043 (6th Cir. 2001) (Rosen, J. concurring) (recognizing the validity of the view that
by accepting a nolo contendere plea, the court is placing its imprimatur upon a fiction in order to

assist a criminal defendant in avoiding civil liability).
33.

In Buonocore, the court noted this disfavor:

Rule 11 is silent with respect to what, if anything, the court must consider before
rejecting a plea of nolo contendere. See id According to the Advisory

Committee:
The defendant who asserts his innocence while pleading guilty or nolo
contendere is often difficult to deal with in a correctional setting, and it may
therefore be preferable to resolve the issue of guilt or innocence at the trial stage
rather than leaving the

issue unresolved, thus complicating subsequent

correctional decisions. The rule is intended to make it clear that a judge may
reject a plea of nolo contendere and require the defendant either to plead not

guilty or to plead guilty under circumstances in which the judge is able to
determine that the defendant is in fact guilty of the crime to which he is pleading
guilty.

Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 advisory committee's note (1974). As this note demonstrates,

34
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Unlike a plea of nolo contendere, an Alford plea is a guilty plea under
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.3 4
The reasons for accepting Alford pleas, although not always clearly
articulated, are reasonable and could even be considered admirable. It
appears that the reason in Alford and similar cases is to permit a defendant
who is facing serious sanctions, such as the death penalty, to escape those
sanctions and receive a more lenient sentence. 35 As noted above in the
discussion of the McCoy case, this was the original raisond'etre of these
types of pleas. 36 It embodies a policy that can be very advantageous to
criminal defendants, especially in capital cases. Alford pleas also resolve
cases efficiently and cheaply and are utilized by defendants to avoid
embarrassment before family and friends, further defendants' interests,
and to permit a guilty plea where the defendant is in psychological denial
of his or her guilt.3 7 It appears that these pleas are most frequently
employed in sex cases.3 8
While most states permit such pleas, they are prohibited in others.3 9
According to one survey in 1997, approximately 3% of federal
defendants and 6.5% of state defendants entered Alford pleas. 40
In practice, the procedure is predicated on two elements: the favorable
plea bargain and the factual basis for the plea. 4' It is the first element that
serves as the primary justification for the Alford plea. However, at least
one court has held that it is not necessary that the defendant receive a
lesser sentence in exchange for his or her plea,42 and another has held that
a defendant who entered an Alford plea may nonetheless be sentenced to
the Advisory Committee recognized the difficulties inherent in the acceptance of

nolo pleas and appears to vest discretion in the district court to adopt a policy
requiring a defendant either to admit guilt or plead not guilty.
416 F.3d 1124, 1130 (10th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). Perhaps for these reasons, military
tribunals do not provide for the entry of nolo contendere pleas. Sanftner, supra note 2, at 23.
34. See supra text accompanying note 31 and authorities cited therein.

35. Ward, supra note 2, at 918-19.
36. See supra notes 15-26 and accompanying text.
37. Bibas, supra note 2, at 1373-74, 1377-78 and authorities cited therein; Molesworth,
supra note 2, at 932-34; Ronis, supra note 2, at 1406-10; Shipley, supra note 2, at 1072-74. It
has also been suggested that such pleas eliminate the need for defendants to lie to the court about
their involvement in order to get the benefit of a favorable plea bargain, Sanftner, supra note 2, at
41; Ward, supranote 2, at 920; Shipley, supra note 2, at 1073, and that they are necessary to give

innocent defendants the same opportunities as guilty defendants, Ronis, supra note 2, at 1410.
38. Bibas, supra note 2, at 1378-79; Ward, supra note 2, at 926-27. See also Hinshaw,
supra note 2, at 281; Molesworth, supra note 2, at 907.

39.
40.
41.
42.
3, 1993).

Bibas, supra note 2, at 1372, 1381; Ronis, supra note 2, at 1399-1400.
Bibas, supra note 2, at 1375 and authority cited therein at n.68.
Alford, 400 U.S. at 37-38.
United States v. Szucko, Nos. 92-2698, 92-2699, 1993 WL 481583, at *1 (5th Cir. Nov.
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death.4 3 Fulfilling the second element, the requirement of a factual basis
for the plea, usually comes in the form of a proffer made by the
prosedutor,44 which will, by its nature, provide a version of the evidence
in the light most favorable to the government. 45 Such a proffer is usually
based solely on the representations of the prosecutor, may be selective,
and is made without contradiction, testing the assertions, or hearing the
evidence that would be favorable to the accused. It is by no means the
equivalent of having a defendant look the trial judge in the eye and admit
that he or she committed the crimes, and falls far short of ensuring that
the defendant did, in fact, commit the offense. 4 6
In all pleas, including straight pleas, Alford pleas, and pleas of nolo
contendere the trial court has discretion whether or not to accept the
plea,47 but for the reasons discussed below, this discretion is particularly
important in the case of an Alford plea.
IV.

THE PROSPECT OF INNOCENT DEFENDANTS PLEADING GUILTY

The Court's decision in Alford gave rise to more questions than it
answered. Perhaps the most profound is whether our criminal justice
system should permit defendants to plead guilty when they swear under
oath that they did not commit the offense and continue to protest their
innocence even after they are sentenced. It is often said, and frequently
argued in court, that the most egregious error we can make is to convict
an innocent person of a crime that he or she did not commit. 48 Yet the
Alford Court quoted with approval the following language from another
court: "[r]easons other than the fact that he is guilty may induce a
defendant to so lead, [and] [h]e must be permitted to judge for himself
in this respect." 9 This quote, along with the rest of the opinion, can only
be interpreted as the Court's condoning, if not encouraging, the trial
courts' acceptance of a guilty plea from defendants even though the
43. In re Pers. Restraint of Cross, 309 P.3d 1186, 1189-92 (Wash. 2013).
44. See United States v. Tunning, 69 F.3d 107, 112-14 (6th Cir. 1995). This has also been
the procedure followed by the court in cases in which the author has participated in Alford pleas.
45. However, at least one court has held that no factual basis need be shown for the
acceptance of a plea of guilty where the defendant does not profess innocence, but merely claims
amnesia regarding the events underlying the charge. Orman v. Cain, 228 F.3d 616, 621-22 (5th
Cir. 2000).
46. See Shipley, supra note 2, at 1071-72 and authorities cited therein (noting that federal
courts do not require that the proffered evidence establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and
some require only evidence meeting the equivalent of a legal sufficiency standard).
47. Alford, 400 U.S. at 38 n.11.
48. See Bibas, supra note 2, at 1382-86, 1390.
49. Alford, 400 U.S. at 33 (quoting State v. Kaufman, 51 Iowa 578, 580, 2 N.W. 275, 276
(1879) (dictum)).

36
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courts are aware that those defendants may not have committed the
offenses charged. It is clear that innocent defendants do plead guilty
utilizing the Alford plea,50 and at least one scholar has argued that both
courts and defense attorneys should recognize an innocent defendant's
"right" to plead guilty under Alford.51
Much has been written about how, in straight plea situations, the
pressures of our plea bargaining system can induce innocent defendants
to plead guilty and admit to offenses that they did not commit. 5 2 This is
in great part due to the power of the prosecutor to exercise prosecutorial
discretion. In the plea bargaining process the government may agree to
take a plea to lesser charges, dismiss charges carrying mandatory
minimum sentences, drop charges against spouses or other loved ones,
decline to file repeat offender papers that would enhance the sentence,
and, most important, not seek the death penalty.
One example of this pressure that can be brought to bear on defendants
is set out in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bordenkircher v.
Hayes.53 There the defendant was charged with uttering -a forged
instrument. He was offered a plea bargain under which he would plead
guilty to the indictment and receive a five-year sentence. However, Mr.
Hayes had a criminal history and the prosecutor advised him that if he did
not plead guilty, he would be re-indicted under a habitual criminal statute
under which he would be subject to a life sentence. Mr. Hayes continued
to assert his innocence, refused to plead guilty, and went to trial. He was
convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment in the penitentiary. The
Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecutor's actions
constituted a valid and constitutional exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Another example that occurs quite frequently involves a situation
where the defendant faces the death penalty on a first-degree murder
charge but, under a plea bargain, pleads guilty to second-degree murder
50. Bibas, supra note 2, at 1384-86. Vota discusses an interesting example. In 1994,
although there was little evidence linking them to the crime, three defendants were convicted of
murdering three eight-year-old boys. Two of the defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment

and the third received a death sentence. DNA testing was not available at the time of the trial, but
subsequent testing that occurred between 2005 and 2007 found that the DNA material gathered
in the case was not consistent with any of the three defendants, but was consistent with one

victim's stepfather and his friend. Ultimately in 2011 after serving more than eighteen years in
prison, the three defendants, while continuing to assert their innocence, entered Alford pleas to
the murders, were sentenced to the time that they already had served, and were released. Vota,
supra note 2, at 1004-10.

51.

Alschuler, supra note 2, at 1296.

52. See, e.g., Juan Roberto Melendez, Presumed Guilty: A Death Row Exoneree Shares
His Story of Supreme Injustice and Reflections on the Death Penalty, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1

(2008); Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1123 (2008); John L.
Barkai,Accuracy Inquiriesfor All Felony and MisdemeanorPleas: Voluntary Pleasbut Innocent

Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 88, 96 (1977).
53. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358-59, 370-72 (1978).
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to save his life. It is quite possible, and quite likely, that such pressures
lead innocent individuals to plead guilty in straight plea situations. But at
least in those cases we have a defendant who is admitting to having
committed the offenses to which she is pleading guilty, frequently under
penalty of perjury. This is sharp contrast to an Alford plea where
defendants are permitted to plead guilty even though they continue to
deny under oath that they committed the crimes.
As Professor Bibas has noted, "It should go without saying that it is
wrong to convict innocent defendants," and we should recoil at the
54
thought that this is occurring in our criminal justice system. While it
may be helpful to refer to philosophers to support this premise, this is,
purely on moral grounds, a self-evident truth that goes to the heart of our
conception of the term "criminal justice." 56 It is one thing to create a plea
bargaining system where this miscarriage of justice may occur due to
pressures upon a defendant to falsely admit to criminal conduct. It is quite
another when the courts approve and encourage a procedure knowing that
innocent defendants are pleading guilty to crimes that they did not
commit. To do so undermines the foundations of our criminal justice
system.5 7
V. EQUAL TREATMENT AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW

In the Alford case, the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear that judges
are not required to accept Alford pleas and the decision whether or not to
do so is left to the discretion of the trial court. The Court also stated that
54.
55.
56.

Bibas, supra note 2, at 1382-85.
Id. at 1384, 1390.
As Professor Ward has noted:
Sadly there are a number of reasons why a truly innocent defendant might be

willing to plead guilty. They include:
(1) the potentially overwhelming nature of the evidence against him; (2) the
disparity in punishment between conviction by plea and conviction at trial; (3) a
desire to protect family or friends from prosecution; (4) the conditions of pretrial
incarceration; (5) a concern that fuller inquiry at trial may result in disclosure of
additional facts which would increase the sentence in the present case or result
in additional prosecutions; (6) a desire to expedite the proceedings because of
feelings of hopelessness; (7) pressure from family, friends, or attorneys, and (8)
"ignorance, deception, delusion, feelings of moral guilt, or self-destructive
inclinations."
Ward, supra note 2, at 918 n.25 (citing Barkai, supra note 52, at 96-97 (quoting State v. Durham,
498 P.2d 149, 151 (Ariz. 1972))).
57. See Shipley, supra note 2, at 1074-75.
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states may bar their courts from accepting Alford pleas where defendants
assert their innocence.5 8 While most states permit such pleas, they are
prohibited in others. 59 Even where the trial court is willing to accept such
a plea, prosecutors, in the exercise of their prosecutorial discretion, may
refuse to agree to an Alford plea. 60 Also, many defense lawyers refuse to
allow clients to plead guilty if they claim innocence, thereby eliminating
the possibility of an Alford plea. 6 1 This creates a situation where, in one
state Alford pleas may be permitted while in another they are barred. In
both federal and state courts, one prosecutor's office may accept such
pleas while another office may not, or some defense lawyers may accept
such pleas while others may not. In the same courthouse some judges
may accept the plea while others may not. 62 Consequently whether or not
a particular defendant will get the benefit of an Alford plea may depend
on the state where the charges are brought, the prosecutor, the defense
attorney, and the judge presiding over the case.
Only if the defendant is fortunate enough to have the stars aligned so
that all four will accept an Alford plea will the defendant be able to get
the benefit of the reduced sanction. The result is that similarly situated
58.

The Court stated:
Our holding does not mean that a trial judge must accept every constitutionally
valid guilty plea merely because a defendant wishes so to plead. A criminal
defendant does not have an absolute right under the Constitution to have his

guilty plea accepted by the court, although the States may by statute of otherwise
confer such a right. Likewise, the States may bar their courts from accepting
guilty pleas from any defendants who assert their innocence. Cf Fed.Rule

Crim.Proc. 11, which gives a trial judge discretion to "refuse to accept a plea of
guilty **

*"

We need not now delineate the scope of that discretion.

Alford, 400 U.S. at 38 n.1 1 (citation omitted). Circuit Courts have also made it clear that trial
courts have discretion as to whether to accept an Alford plea. United States v. Hinton, No. 92-

5123, 1992 WL 385240, at *2 (4th Cir. Dec. 23, 1992); United States v. Cox, 923 F.2d 519, 525
(7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Morrow, 914 F.2d 608, 611 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v.
O'Brien, 601 F.2d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1979), and may be able to adopt a policy of refusing to
accept any such plea, see United States v. Mancinas-Flores, 588 F.3d 677, 684 (9th Cir. 2009);
id. at 689 (Rymer, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, at least one court has
held that the record must reflect that the decision to reject the plea was the result of an exercise of

discretion after consideration of all relevant factors, including possibly a general policy to not
accept Alford pleas. Id. at 684-85. Regarding the discretion reposed in the courts to reject Alford
pleas, see also Bibas, supra note 2, at 1372; Shipley, supra note 2, at 1068 and authorities cited
therein (noting that trial courts have virtually unrestricted discretion to refuse to accept Alford

pleas, even if based on mere "judicial whim").
59.

See Bibas, supra note 2, at 1377; Ronis, supra note 2, at 1390.

60.

See United States v. Tunning, 69 F.3d 107, 113 (6th Cir. 1995). See also sources cited

infra note 76.

61. Altshuler, supra note 2, at 1297-1300.
62. This not only results in defendants being treated unequally, it can lead to judge
shopping to find a judge who will accept the Alford plea. Shipley, supra note 2, at 1086-87.
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defendants will be treated much differently depending on these factors.
This may not appear to be a matter of concern until we consider real life
situations. In one county where the district attorney refuses to accept
Alford pleas a defendant may be sentenced to thirty years after a
conviction, where in the next county, due to the fact that the district
attorney does accept Alford pleas, the same defendant would have
received a sentence of only ten years. Perhaps most disturbing, in one
courtroom the judge may refuse to accept an Alford plea and the
defendant is convicted and sentenced to death, while in the courtroom
next door where the judge does accept Alford pleas the defendant's life
would have been spared.
These situations raise serious questions of equal treatment and even
equal protection of the law. Similarly situated individuals are treated
much differently even in the same courthouse, and whether a defendant's
case is assigned to one judge or the judge next door can literally be a
matter of life or death. The result in each case will depend on whether the
judge, the prosecutor, the defense attorney, and in state cases, the law of
the state, will permit an Alford plea.
VI. OTHER NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ALFORD PLEA

A. The Purposes of the CriminalJustice System
In addition to the prospect of innocent defendants pleading guilty and
the equal protection problems, there are other implications of the Alford
plea that are only regarded as troublesome. Theoretically, the criminal
law and its sanctions have a number of purposes, such as rehabilitation,
deterrence, education, incapacitation, prevention, retribution, and
restoration. 63 It is well recognized that an important antecedent to
rehabilitation is the admission of the offender that he or she is guilty of
wrongdoing. 64 A procedure such as an Alford plea that permits
defendants to "plead guilty" in order to get a reduced sanction, while at
the same time swearing under oath that they did not commit the offense,
eliminates this significant step in the rehabilitative process. It may, in
fact, be detrimental to that process because it permits defendants to
believe that they have "gamed" the system, 65 and many defendants who
63.

WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 1.5 (5th ed. 2010).

64.
65.

Bibas, supra note 2, at 1389, 1393-94, 1403-04.

The defendant who asserts his innocence while pleading guilty or nolo
contendere is often difficult to deal with in a correctional setting, and it may
therefore be preferable to resolve the issue of guilt or innocence at the trial stage
rather than leaving the issue unresolved, thus complicating subsequent
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enter Alford pleas later challenge their pleas on direct appeal or on habeas
corpus review.66 Defendants who enter Alford pleas may resist treatment
and are much more likely to reoffend.6 7
Part of the retributive purpose of the criminal justice system is to bring
closure to the victims and society in general. This is accomplished by
having those accused stand before the court and admit that they
committed the criminal acts, or by the verdict of guilty after the facts have
been fully aired at a public trial. There is an undeniable cathartic effect
that results from either of these events, especially for the victims and their
families. However, there is no closure resulting from a procedure where
the proceedings are terminated by a process where the defendant is
permitted to continue to deny culpability while receiving a reduced
sanction. This may well aggravate rather than close the wound created by
the offense. 69 Members of society may also find it incomprehensible that
defendants can plead guilty while claiming that they are innocent." As
correctional decisions.
United States v. Buonocore, 416 F.3d 1124, 1130 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. I1
advisory committee's notes (1974)). Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has noted, "[tihe average
defendant may have some difficulty reconciling himself to the notion of pleading guilty while
maintaining his innocence." United States v. Punch, 709 F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1983). See also
Bibas, supra note 2, at 1389. This issue of rehabilitation is particularly important in the juvenile
process, and the Ohio Supreme Court has held that, even though in that state adults may enter
Alford pleas, due to these concerns, juveniles may not. Schultz, supra note 2, at 194 (citing In re

Kirby, 804 N.E. 2d 476, 479 (Ohio 2004)).
66. See United States v. Harlan, 35 F.3d 176, 182 n.7 (5th Cir. 1994) and authorities cited
therein.

67.
68.
69.
70.

Bibas, supranote 2, at 1397 n.180 and authority cited therein.
Id at 1402.
Id. at 1406-07; Molesworth supra note 2, at 937-40.
At least one court has recognized that the public might not understand or accept this

concept. In United States v. Buonocore, the court stated:

Learned Hand referred to the idea of accepting nolo pleas as "a foolish concept."
See 1A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure, § 177, at 285-86 3d ed. 1999) (noting that use of the nolo plea has
been criticized as "one of the factors which has tended to breed contempt for
federal law enforcement" because "the public regards consent to such a plea by
the Government as an admission that it has only a technical case at most and the
whole proceeding was just a fiasco") (quotations omitted); see also United States

v. Bearden, 274 F.3d 1031, 1043 (6th Cir.2001) (Rosen, J. concurring) (urging
court to hold that it within judge's discretion to adopt general policy against nolo
pleas and recognizing that by accepting a nolo plea, the court is placing its
imprimatur upon a fiction in order to assist a criminal defendant in avoiding civil
liability"); United States v. Bednarski, 445 F.2d 364, 366 (1st Cir. 1971)
("However legallysound the Alford principle, which ofcourse we do not dispute,
the public might well not understand or accept the fact that a defendant who
deniedhis guiltwas nonetheless placed in a positionofpleadingguilty andgoing
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Professor Bibas has noted, Alford pleas breed public doubt and lack of
respect for the criminal justice system.
Alford pleas also undermine the deterrence function of punishment.
that is
"[P]unishment is a powerful 'symbol' of moral blameworthiness 72
The
others."'
for
example
an
[sets]
and
'medicinal for the criminal
are
defendants
efficacy of this example is substantially diminished when
permitted to dodge responsibility by entering a plea of guilty while at the
same time swearing under oath that they did not commit the offense.
B. Judges
The Alford plea creates a serious moral, if not ethical, dilemma for the
judges who, in the exercise of their discretion, have to decide whether
they will accept such a plea. On the one hand, judges may well take the
view that they will not be a party to a process that could involve an
innocent defendant pleading guilty due to the pressures of the plea
bargaining process. They may understandably, if not commendably, take
the position that they will not enter a judgment of guilt and impose a
sentence on defendants who, at the hearing on a proffered guilty plea,
73
swear under oath that they did not commit the offenses charged. These
judges may take the position that "pleas without confessions leave
victims frustrated and defendants defiant and resistant to treatment," and
74
insist that defendants admit their wrongdoing. As one court has noted:
to jail. ").

&

416 F.3d 1124, 1130 n.3 (10th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Fourth Circuit and the
Fifth Circuit have noted that the logic underlying the Alford plea is counterintuitive and raises the
question of why the defendant is simultaneously admitting guilt and maintaining innocence. See
United States v. Morrow, 914 F.2d 608, 612 n.6 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Punch,
709 F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1983)).
71. Bibas, supra note 2, at 1386-87; see also Shipley, supra note 2, at 1075.
72. Bibas, supra note 2, at 1390 (quoting from a letter from Immanuel Kant to J.B. Erhard
(Dec. 21, 1792), in Kant: Philosophical Correspondence 1759-99, at 199 (Arnulf Zweig ed.
trans. 1967)).
73. See Shipley, supra note 2, at 1068 and authorities cited therein (noting that courts rarely
accept guilty pleas accompanied by claims of innocence).
74. Bibas, supra note 2, at 1379. Two situations recounted by Professor Bibas reflect this
problem faced by judges. One long-time judge reported that he previously allowed defendants to
enter nolo contendere pleas who would then deny to the probation officer that they committed the

offenses. For example, in a rape case they would say that the victim had consented to the sexual
encounter. Once this judge ceased permitting nolo contendere pleas, defense lawyers confronted

their clients and almost none insisted in going to trial. Id. at 1397-98. In another case before a
different judge the defendant attempted to negotiate Alford or nolo contendere plea, but the judge
and the prosecutor refused to countenance such a plea. The defendant then entered a straight plea

and admitted her guilt to an attempt to bomb two cars. Immediately thereafter the defendant told
reporters that she was, in fact, innocent of these crimes and moved to withdraw her plea. The
judge denied her motion, and only then did the defendant tremble with emotion and state that she
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[I]t is unseemly to say the least, for courts--whose charge isjustice-to condone convictions without trial of those who proclaim their
innocence. Indeed, the expediency-based practice has all the
hallmarks of an Alice-in-Wonderland charade. Since it permits
defendants who are in fact guilty to think that they are getting away
with something, the Alford-type plea also impedes rehabilitation."
On the other hand, judges also know that if they do not accept such a
plea, the defendants may be put to death. Their lives would have been
spared had they appeared before the judge in the- next courtroom who
would have been willing to accept such a plea. It may be viewed as unfair
to place our judges in those situations, which could well pressure judges
to accept these pleas despite their moral and ethical reservations about
doing so.
C. Prosecutors
Prosecutors also have discretion as to whether they will agree to
Alford pleas, and, like judges, they may dislike the message that these
pleas may send and oppose them on policy or moral grounds.76 If
prosecutors decide to agree to such pleas, they quite obviously cannot do
so in every case.n They must then decide in which cases they will accept
the Alford plea and in which cases they will reject such proffers. These
decisions, while difficult in their own right, are made even more difficult
by equal protection concerns and the rehabilitative and closure issues
discussed above.
D. CriminalDefense Attorneys
Some of the most serious problems with Alford pleas are reserved for
criminal defense attorneys.7p Most would probably prefer to take the
was sorry for harming others. Id. at 1364-65.
75. State v. Weaver, No. 91-2568-CR-FT, 1992 WL 126807, at *2 n.1 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar.
24, 1992) (internal citations omitted).
76. Bibas, supranote 2, at 1379. For example, since the public may not understand how a
defendant who professes innocence may plead guilty, the U.S. Department of Justice discourages
Alford pleas and federal prosecutors may not accept such pleas without Department approval. Id.
at 1381 and authorities cited therein. In Washington State, the King County Prosecutors Office
has shifted away from Alford pleas in sexual assault cases. See Molesworth, supra note 2, at 934.
See also Mofse, supra note 2, at 10.

77. If they do agree to accept Alford pleas, there is a very real problem for both judges and
prosecutors in determining in which cases to accept the pleas. Given the choice, most,
if not all,
defendants would choose this procedure, and Alford pleas could become the most common pleas
in criminal procedure. See Shipley, supra note 2, at 1075-76
78. It has been argued that the Alford plea assists criminal defense attorneys, since the

clients will not be required to lie to their lawyers. Ward, supra note 2, at 920. However, any
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moral and ethical position that they will not in any way be involved in a
situation where an innocent client pleads guilty. Defense attorneys,
perhaps more than judges and prosecutors, do not want to look
themselves in the mirror knowing that a client of theirs, who did not
commit a criminal offense, is nonetheless serving a substantial jail
sentence for that offense. As a result, many defense attorneys refuse to
allow clients to plead guilty if they claim they are innocent. 7 9 However,
unlike judges or prosecutors, criminal defense attorneys may not have the
discretion to decide whether or not they will participate in an Alford plea,
especially if they are appointed by the court. Retained counsel would
probably be in a position to simply withdraw from the representation, but
court-appointed lawyers would have to seek leave of the court.
Whether or not criminal defense attorneys would be able to withdraw
from the representation, there is another problem. They generally take the
position that they should be able to afford their clients the same
representation and opportunities that would be available to those clients
with any other defense attorney, the present attorney's personal beliefs or
convictions notwithstanding. This can present problems with the Alford
plea in any situation but, again, the death penalty presents the most
dramatic scenario. If the defense attorney, because of personal
convictions, refuses to participate in an Alford plea, that attorney may
ultimately see the client convicted and executed. However, if that client
80
has a different attorney who would agree to be part of an Alford plea,
the client's life would be spared. This places great pressure on defense
attorneys to abandon the dictates of their conscience and their perception
of the ethics of the situation, and advise their clients to accept an Alford
plea.
E. CriminalDefendants
Ironically, although the Alford procedure was adopted to benefit
criminal defendants, the Alford plea may have serious negative
implications for those defendants. Professor Ward has discussed these
implications in his article in which he sets out the reasons why criminal

advantage gained by this fact is outweighed by the factors discussed herein.
79. See Alschuler, supra note 2, at 1297-1300. These concerns would, of course, not be
present if the defendant advised the defense attorney within the privilege that he did commit the
offense and then merely refused to admit that he did so in open court. However, this would
probably be a rare occurrence. Defense attorneys may also refuse to accept Alford pleas because
they render the defendant ineligible for any treatment program established for sex offenders.
Molesworth, supra note 2, at 937.

80. Some attorneys will agree to be a party to an Alford plea while believing the client is
innocent while others intentionally avoid learning the facts about guilt so that they may make
arguments inconsistent with the undiscovered facts. Bibas, supra note 2, at 1374, 1405-06.
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defendants should avoid Alford pleas.81 Among these reasons are longer
sentences, revocation of probation, decreased likelihood of parole, and
adverse Megan's law implications.
At sentencing, remorse is frequently taken into account regarding the
likelihood that the defendant will engage in future criminal conduct.
Depending on the jurisdiction, expression of remorse may be a mitigating
factor at sentencing or lack of remorse may be an aggravating factor. 82 In
either case, defendants who enter an Alford plea and do not admit guilt
do not receive the benefit of expression of remorse and are subjected to
increased sentences. 83
Defendants who are placed on probation after conviction are
frequently required to participate in counseling or other programs
intended to assist them in avoiding future criminal conduct. This is
particularly true in sex cases where Alford pleas are very common.
However, such programs often require that the defendants admit
responsibility for the underlying offenses.84 Defendants who entered an
Alford plea with the understanding that they would not admit
responsibility, are then required to do so. If they refuse, their probation is
revoked, and they are incarcerated for the remainder of their sentence.
Alford-type defendants who are sentenced to jail encounter a similar
problem when they become eligible for parole. Most jurisdictions employ
a process providing that the prisoner seeking parole must appear before
the parole board and state why early release should be permitted. Part of
this process may include consideration of the inmate's expression of
remorse, or lack thereof, in determining whether parole should be
granted. The defendants who entered Alford pleas thinking that they
would be able to continue to profess their innocence have an obvious
problem. If they continue to deny involvement, they may be denied parole
for failure to express remorse and the necessary insight of the
wrongfulness of their conduct. 86
Many, if not most, Alford pleas are entered in sex cases, and most
81.

Ward, supra note 2.

82. Alford-type defendants are not exempted from these provisions. Id. at 923-25 and
authorities cited therein.
83. Id. at 921-26 and authorities cited therein. It has been noted: "[n]ow picture a judge
faced with a crying victim and clear proof of guilt on one side and an Alford defendant brazenly
denying culpability on the other side. Not a good thing." Moyse, supra note 2, at 11.
84. Alford-type defendants are not exempted from such requirements. Ward, supra note 2,
at 926-32 and authorities cited therein.
85. Id. An excellent example is provided by the case of Warren v. Richland Cnty. Cir. Ct.,
223 F.3d 454 (7th Cir. 2000). In Warren, a defendant charged with sexual assault on a child
entered an Alford plea to avoid admitting guilt, was placed on probation, and then had his
probation revoked for refusing to admit guilt during treatment. The revocation was upheld by the
court.

86.

Ward, supra note 2, at 932-33 and authorities cited therein.
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states have now adopted some version of the Sexual Offender
Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. § 16901, commonly known
as Megan's Law. These laws allow information to be released to the
public depending on the risk level of the offender. Many states utilize a
worksheet to determine risk level-the more points on the worksheet, the
higher the risk level. Other states utilize the worksheet to evaluate
potential sentences. Part of the worksheet assigns points for refusing to
accept responsibility for the charged sexual conduct. Here again, the
Alford-type defendants encounter a problem. They entered the Alford
plea with the understanding that they would be permitted to deny
responsibility, but if they continue to do so, they may be classified as
87
high-risk sexual offenders subject to community notification.
Professor Ward points out that there is no requirement that defendants
be notified of the possibilities of a greater sentence, probation revocation,
denial of parole, or adverse Megan's Law implications at the time that
they enter an Alford plea. Therefore, the defendants will be later blindsided by these serious and unforeseen adverse consequences." As a
result, Professor Ward takes the position that defendants should avoid the
Alford plea.89
There is a split of authority as to whether Alford pleas will be accepted
in juvenile proceedings. 90 In jurisdictions where they are accepted,
9
juvenile defendants encounter many of the problems discussed. 1
However, there may additional negative implications in the juvenile
setting. An Alford plea will not prevent waiver of the juveniles to adult
criminal court or their continuing to be confined after their twenty-first
birthday, and an Alford plea entered after transfer to be tried as an adult
92
may preclude later appeal of the transfer decision.
VII.

COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES

It has been stated that the collateral consequences flowing from an
Alford plea are the same as those flowing from a straight plea. 93 However,
87. Id. at 934-35 and authorities cited therein.
88. Id. at 925-26, 927-32, 934-40 and authorities cited therein. See also Hinshaw, supra
note 2, at 297-302.
89. Ward, supra note 2, at 943. His article is entitled, A PleaBest Not Taken: Why Criminal
Defendants Should Avoid the Alford Plea.

90. Schultz, supra note 2, at 193-96 and authorities cited therein, including In re Kirby,
804 N.E. 2d 476, 479-80 (Ohio 2004). Interestingly, in that case the court held that due to the
importance of an admission in the rehabilitative process, Alford pleas will not be allowed in
juvenile proceedings, even though they would be permitted in adult situations.
91. Id. at 191-93 and authorities cited therein.
92. Id. at 195-98 and authorities cited therein.
93. In Wirsching v. Colorado, 360 F.3d 1191, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 2004) the court stated:
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upon closer examination, this is not always the case. Different courts have
taken different positions on different collateral consequences.
A. The Use of a Conviction Resultingfrom an Alford Plea as a
PredicateOffense and in Sentencing Guideline Situations
Some statutes require that in order to be convicted of the offense set
out in the statute, the defendant must have been previously convicted of
another offense, referred to as the predicate offense. In reviewing a
federal conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,94 the
Second Circuit held that a prior Connecticut conviction resulting from an
Alford plea could serve as the predicate felony even though Connecticut
does place some limitations on the use of this type of plea. 95
Under the federal Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) 96 any
defendant who is convicted of possession of a firearm by a previously
convicted felon and has three prior convictions for "violent felon[ies]" or
"serious drug offense[s]" must serve a minimum mandatory sentence of
at least fifteen years. The preferred approach to addressing whether the
prior conviction qualifies for sentence enhancement under the ACCA is
the categorical approach. Under this approach the court simply considers
the statutory elements of the prior offense and the fact of conviction,9 7
and Alford pleas qualify as prior convictions. 98 If, however, the statute is
so broad as to render a court unable to determine whether a predicate
crime is a "violent felony," the court then employs the, modified
categorical approach enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Shepard

For example, in Blohm v. CI.R., 994 F.2d 1542, 1554-55 (1 Ith Cir. 1993), the
Eleventh Circuit held a taxpayer who had entered into an A/ford plea to a tax
evasion charge was collaterally estopped from denying fraud in a subsequent
civil proceeding. See id. at 1554 ("[T]he collateral consequences flowing from
an Alford plea are the same as those flowing from an ordinary plea of guilt.");
Cortese v. Black, 838 F.Supp. 485, 491 (D.Colo.1993) ("[C]ourts treat Alford
pleas as having the same preclusive effect as a guilty plea."), aff'd, No. 95-1429,
1996 WL 346618 (10th Cir. June 2, 1996).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
95. Burrell v. United States, 384 F.3d 22, 28-31 (2d Cir. 2004).
96. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
97. United States v. Taylor, 659 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Taylor v. United
States, 495 U.S. 575, 600-02 (1990)).
98. United States v. Powell, 441 F. App'x 502, 506 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Martinez, 30 F. App'x 900, 904 (10th Cir. 2002). See also Gooch, supra note 2, at 1758 n. 16 and
authorities cited therein (noting that all federal circuits have, in some, form held that an Alford
plea is functionally a guilty plea and that Alford defendants cannot rely on their claims of
innocence to preclude a later finding that they were convicted).
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v. United States.99 Under this approach the court must decide whether
materials, such as the charging document, written plea agreement,
transcript of the plea colloquy, and any other explicit factual finding to
which the defendant assented show that he or she "necessarily admitted"
to committing a violent felony.' 0 0 In applying this modified categorical
approach, the Fourth Circuit has held that a conviction resulting from an
Alford plea could not serve as an ACCA predicate. Since the defendant
had pleaded guilty without ever agreeing to the truth of the proffered
facts, the court could not find under Shepardthat he had confirmed his
involvement in a violent felony.' 0 ' However, even under this approach,
where the nature of the violent felony can be determined by the applicable
charging documents, the Alford-based conviction may serve as an ACCA
predicate offense.' 0 2
Questions have also arisen regarding the use of Alford pleas under the
federal Sentencing Guidelines. One issue involves whether a conviction
entered pursuant to such a plea may be used to enhance a defendant's
sentence under the Guidelines. In United States v. Mackins the Third
Circuit held that, "an Alford plea is, without doubt, an adjudication of
guilt and is no different than any other guilty plea for purposes of §
4A1.1."103 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has held that an Alford plea
qualifies as "adjudication of guilt" under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a), and a
sentence imposed under such plea qualifies as a "prior sentence" within
the meaning of that subsection.1 0 4 It has also been held that where the
charging document in an Alford plea case establishes that a prior
conviction was for a crime of violence as defined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a),
a defendant is subject to a heightened base offense level under U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(a)(3). 0 5 However, in an Alford plea situation where it was not
otherwise established that a prior conviction involved a controlled
substance offense under Section 2K2.1(a) of the Guidelines, that
06
conviction could not be used as a predicate offense.' Another issue is
whether a defendant who enters an Alford plea should be given a sentence
reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Under the Guidelines a
defendant may seek a reduction in his or her offense level under Section
3E1.1, and a court may decrease that offense level, if the defendant
99. 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005).
100. See id. at 16.
101. United States v. Alston, 611 F.3d 219, 221, 227-28 (4th Cir. 2010).
102. United States v. Powell, 441 F. App'x 502, 505-06 (9th Cir. 2011).
103. 218 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2000). This case related to Section 4Al.2(a)(1) of the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines which deals with whether a prior sentence should be used for computing a
defendant's criminal history category under § 4A1.1.
104. United States v. King, 673 F.3d 274, 282-83 (4th Cir. 2012). See also United States v.
Martinez, 30 F. App'x 900, 905 (10th Cir. 2002).
105. United States v. Vinton, 631 F.3d 476, 484-87 (8th Cir. 2011).
106. United States v. Savage, 542 F.3d 959, 966-67 (2d Cir. 2008).
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"clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense."
Courts have determined that a trial court may consider whether a
defendant has entered an Alford plea as a relevant factor in refusing to
afford a reduction of offense level for acceptance of responsibility.o 7
A constitutional issue lurking in many of these situations arises from
the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey'0 8 and
Blakely v. Washington.'0 9 These cases generally require that a fact used
to enhance a sentence must be admitted by a defendant or proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.1"0 Defendants who have entered Alford pleas,
or any other type of plea resulting in a conviction, may have their
sentences enhanced in three different situations: (1) A defendant may face
sentencing enhancements based upon aggravating facts or underlying
conduct in a single case; (2) A defendant in a later case may receive an
enhancement of sentence based upon the underlying conduct supporting
the earlier Alford-based conviction; and (3) A defendant in a later
unrelated case may be subject to a sentencing enhancement based upon
the fact of his or her prior conviction resulting from an earlier Alford
plea."' An enhancement resulting from the third situation, one based on
a prior Alford-type conviction, meets the requirements of Apprendi and
Blakely and is constitutionally valid.1 2 However, the situation is less
clear with regard to the first and second scenarios, and courts that have
addressed these issues have reached different conclusions."13
B. CollateralEstoppel
A straight plea of guilty will usually collaterally estop a defendant
from denying liability in a subsequent civil case. On the other hand, pleas
of nolo contendere have been found not to constitute an admission
leading to this result, and for this reason, criminal defendants frequently
seek to enter such a plea to avoid being precluded from later contesting
their civil liability." Courts have generally held that a defendant who
enters an Alford plea is collaterally estopped from later denying civil
liability." 5 For 'example, in Blohm v. Commissioner,the Eleventh Circuit,
noting the difference between an Alford plea and a plea of nolo
contendere, held that a taxpayer who had entered an Alford plea to a tax
107. United States v. Harlan, 35 F.3d 176, 180-82 (5th Cir. 1994). See also United States v.
Holt, 985 F.2d 563, 1993 WL 13331, at *2-3 (7th Cir. 1993); Ward, supra note 2, at 925.
108. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
109. 542 U.S. 296, 301, 313 (2004).
110. Gooch, supra note 2, at 1766-70.
111. Id. at 1757-58.
112. Id. at 1758 n.16 and authorities cited therein.
113. Id. at 1773-78 and authorities cited therein.
114. See supra text accompanying note 42.
115. Id. See also Shipley, supra note 2, at 1083-85 and authorities cited therein at n.196.
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evasion charge was collaterally estopped from denying fraud in a
subsequent civil proceeding." 6 However, some states have reached the
opposite conclusion."

7

C. Impeachment with PriorConvictions
Under some circumstances, prior convictions may be used to impeach
the credibility of witnesses or a party. For example, under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, certain convictions may be used to impeach the
credibility of a witness, based upon the assumption that witnesses who
have been convicted of crimes may be less credible than those who have
not." 8 Here again, different courts have reached different conclusions as
to whether a conviction predicated on an Alford plea may be used for
these purposes. Some have held that Alford pleas," and even convictions
120
based on pleas of nolo contendere, may be used to impeach witnesses.
However, as the Second Circuit has noted, "Connecticut will not permit
Alford or nolo contendere pleas to be used to impeach the credibility of a
party opponent on disputed facts."'21
D. Other Situations
The question of the effect of an Alford plea has arisen in several other
situations as well. It has been held that such a conviction may constitute
a "conviction" for purposes of removal of an alien under the Immigration
and Nationality Act. 122 However, another court decided that a state
conviction based on an Alford plea would not alone suffice for the
116. Blohm v. Comm'r, 994 F.2d 1542, 1554-55 (11th Cir. 1993). See also Lackey v.
Comm'r, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1330, 1337 (1976); Molesworth, supra note 2, at 933-34 and
authority cited therein.
117. See, e.g., In re Pers. Restraint of Cross, 309 P.3d 1186, 1190 (Wash. 2013); Fleck v.
State Farm Ins. Co., No. 89-L-14-070, 1990 WL 124648 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 24,1990).
118. FED. R. EvID. 609.
119. See, e.g., United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1983); State v.
Allen, No. 32,066, 2013 WL 6800664, at *14 (N.M. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2013); People v. Miller,
694 N.E.2d 61, 64 (N.Y. 1998).
120. Brewer v. City of Napa, 210 F.3d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Sonny
Mitchell Ctr., 934 F.2d 77, 79 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). Interestingly, in the latter case the
court held that the Fifth Circuit's former rule precluding the use of such convictions for
impeachment purposes did not survive the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See also
Moise, supra note 2, at 10.

121. Burrell v. United States, 384 F.3d 22, 30 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Krowka v. Colt Patent
Fire Arm Mfg. Co., 8 A.2d 5, 9 (Conn. 1939)). In Krowka, the court held that plaintiffs nolo
contendere conviction for breach of peace and loitering was inadmissible to impeach plaintifPs
claim that he was assaulted by defendant's security guards. 8 A.2d at 9. See also Doe v. Univ. of
Conn., No. 3:09 CV 1071(JGM), 2013 WL 4504299, at *71-72 (D. Conn. Aug. 22, 2013).
122. Arimbola v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 173, 180-81 (2d Cir. 2004).
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revocation of the probation of a federal defendant.1 23 It is appropriate for
a federal agency to consider an Alford plea in determining whether to
discharge an employee.1 24 A defendant who entered an Alford plea to
sexual assault of a child and was placed on probation could, thereafter,
have his probation revoked for refusal to admit guilt during treatment.1 25
Similarly, directing a sex offender whose conviction was based on an
Alford plea to participate in a prison treatment program, which required
that he admit that he committed the sex offense or incur sanctions did not
violate his Fifth Amendment rights.1 26
VIII. CONCLUSION

One court has said that the "expediency-based practice [of the Alford
plea] has all of the hallmarks of an Alice-in-Wonderland charade."' 27 The
U.S. Supreme Court decision in A/ford was certainly well intentioned.
However, the decision has created a number of serious problems, most of
which may not have been foreseen by the Court.
It seems self-evident that a criminal justice system should, first and
foremost, be devoted to making sure that no innocent person is ever
convicted of a crime that he or she did not commit. However, Alford pleas
have led to courts openly acknowledging that innocent defendants are
pleading guilty to criminal offenses and even encouraging them to do so.
This undermines our criminal justice system and should, alone, lead us to
prohibit defendants who profess their innocence from pleading guilty. We
should, instead, ensure that all defendants who plead guilty are, in fact,
guilty, by requiring them to admit that they committed the offenses
charged.
In virtually all cases, Alford pleas raise serious equal treatment and
equal protection issues, issues that can literally be a matter of life or death.
The best example is provided by the situation where a defendant in one
courtroom has his or her life spared due to the acceptance of an Alford
plea, while in the next courtroom, a similarly situated defendant is given
the death penalty because that judge will not accept an Alford plea.
Alford pleas are in direct conflict with objectives of the criminal
justice system, such as rehabilitation, education, retribution, restoration,
123. United States v. Bress, No. 7:02-CR-22-7F, 2013 WL 1730145, at *30-31 (E.D.N.C.
Apr. 22, 2013). The court did provide the Government with the opportunity to show by a
preponderance of the evidence at a revocation hearing that the defendant did commit the state
offense.
124. Crofoot v. Gov't Printing Office, 823 F.2d 495, 498-99 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
125. Warren v. Richland Cnty. Cir. Ct., 223 F.3d 454, 457-58 (7th Cir. 2000).
126. Wirsching v. Colorado, 360 F.3d 1191, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 2004).
127. State v. Weaver, No. 91-2568-CR-FT, 1992 WL 126807, at *2 n.l (Wis. Ct. App. Mar.
24, 1992) (internal citations omitted), quoted in Ward, supra note 2, at 943.
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and deterrence. They also damage the credibility of the system. Ordinary
citizens find it incomprehensible that we permit defendants to plead
guilty who, at the same time, swear under oath that they are innocent.
Alford pleas present moral, ethical, and practical problems for judges,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys. Ironically, these pleas may harm the
criminal defendants that they were designed to help. The negative
implications for these defendants have led the Director of Clinical
Programs at one law school to recommend that defendants avoid Alford
pleas.1 2 8 While the collateral consequences of straight guilty pleas are
generally well defined, this is not the case in Alford-type situations.
Different courts have reached different conclusions regarding these
consequences, resulting in uncertainty and disparate treatment.
However, even if we conclude that Alford was wrongly decided, it is
unlikely that the Court will ever reconsider its decision. Reversing Alford
could raise even greater questions, including issues of retroactivity. We
will, therefore, be left to continue to deal with what appears to be a
questionable and problematic decision. However, the difficulties created
by Alford can be mitigated if judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys
exercise their discretion and consistently take the position that they will
not be parties to an Alford plea. On the state level, legislatures and
appellate courts can refuse to recognize these pleas within their
jurisdictions. Such measures will not entirely eliminate Alford pleas, but
they will go a long way to ameliorate the problems that these pleas create
for our judges, prosecutors, criminal defense attorneys, defendants,
members of our society, and our criminal justice system as a whole.

128. Ward, supranote 2, at 943. His article is entitled, A Plea Best Not Taken: Why Criminal
Defendants ShouldAvoid the Alford Plea.
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